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INTRODUCTION 
SpaceX plans to have its first astronauts land on Mars by 2026.1 Blue 
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 1. Neel V. Patel, Elon Musk Unveils SpaceX’s Timeline for Sending People to Mars: Will We 
See Humans on Mars by 2026?, INVERSE (June 19, 2017), https://www.inverse.com/article/33146-elon-
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Origin wants to take tourists to space by April 2019.2 The European Space 
Agency points to the possibilities of mining Helium-3 on the moon to provide 
cleaner energy here on Earth.3 Space tourism, exploration, and exploitation are 
very real possibilities in the near future—at least technologically. Legally, 
however, the way forward is less clear. 
Under the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies (commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty), no State has the right to 
claim as sovereign territory the moon or any other celestial body. 4 Some critics 
see the Outer Space Treaty as merely an outdated relic from the Cold War era,5 
but there are good reasons for maintaining the fundamental principles 
undergirding the law in its current form. If the Treaty were repealed or 
interpreted to allow a free-for-all, first-come, first-served method of allocating 
space property rights (as some have suggested either should, or will, happen),6 
this would likely produce an extremely chaotic and unequal allocation of 
resources. Developing nations that currently lack space capabilities would be at 
a significant disadvantage relative to States possessing such capabilities, and the 
ensuing State actions would likely result in an unequal territorial grab leaving 
few, if any, resources for those nations technologically incapable of space 
exploration. 
The international community is faced with the dilemma of balancing 
economic efficiency with equitable access.7 Different interpretations of the Outer 
Space Treaty may favor one of these principles over the other. With President 
Donald Trump’s announcement on June 18, 2018, that he was directing the 
Pentagon to establish a Space Force, State action in space is likely to increase—
be it shaped by the interests of individual nations or the interests of the 
international community.8 Thus, the stakes of an international agreement on the 
appropriate interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty are particularly high. 
This Note traces the history of the non-appropriation principle from its 
inception in 1967 through today as States seek to strike the proper balance 
 
musk-spacex-timeline-mars-mission-new-space. 
 2. Jackie Wattles, Blue Origin CEO: We’re Taking Tourists to Space within 18 Months, CNN 
(Oct. 5. 2017, 7:32 PM), http://cnnmon.ie/2gfDemy. 
 3. Helium-3 Mining on the Lunar Surface, EUR. SPACE AGENCY, http://www.esa.int/
Our_Activities/Preparing_for_the_Future/Space_for_Earth/Energy/Helium-3_mining_on_the_lunar_
surface (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). 
 4. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
 5. Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Space Law: Its Cold War Origins and Challenges in the Era of 
Globalization, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2004). 
 6. See infra text accompanying note 113. 
 7. Kyle A. Jacobsen, From Interstate to Interstellar Commerce: Incorporating the Private 
Sector into International Aerospace Law, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 159, 169 (2014). Environmental implications 
are also compelling when arriving at a preferred outcome. Such considerations are, however, beyond the 
scope of this paper. For more on this, see, for example, William R. Kramer, In Dreams Begin 
Responsibilities – Environmental Impact Assessment and Outer Space Development, 19 ENVTL. PRAC. 
128 (2017), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14660466.2017.1338874. 
 8. Katie Rogers, Trump Orders Establishment of Space Force as Sixth Military Branch, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 18, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2JZCZJg. 
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between efficiency and equity. Part I begins with a brief introduction to the Outer 
Space Treaty and to the concept of customary international law as it relates to 
outer space, and it then argues that customary international law originally treated 
the non-appropriation principle of the Outer Space Treaty as unambiguous and 
broadly applicable to all space activity. Part II examines a shift in State behavior 
that has carved out an exception to the non-appropriation principle, now arguably 
recognized in customary international law, that permits the appropriation of 
extracted space resources.9 Part III suggests that a second major shift in the 
interpretation of the principle, this time to allow private appropriation of space 
in situ, will soon be similarly underway. Finally, Part IV argues that economic 
pressures may make this second shift inevitable and that it would be in the best 
interests of the international community to preempt this change. A carefully 
framed legal order should be established, potentially through an international 
leasing system modeled on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS),10 to preserve the original goals and purposes of the Outer Space 
Treaty during this second shift. 
I. ORIGINAL INTERPRETATION OF THE NON-APPROPRIATION PRINCIPLE 
UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
This Part begins with a brief introduction to the Outer Space Treaty and 
customary international law as it applies in space. It then turns to a legal history 
analysis of the original meaning ascribed to the non-appropriation principle of 
the Outer Space Treaty, concluding that the principle was originally construed 
quite broadly under customary international law to prohibit nearly all forms of 
appropriation of space materials, including not only celestial bodies but also 
extractable space resources. 
A. An Introduction to the Outer Space Treaty 
Even defining “space” is itself a legally fraught exercise—where does the 
Earth’s atmosphere end and space begin? Various legal theories have been 
advanced to demarcate this limit.11 There is no universally accepted boundary, 
but the Kármán line, at an altitude of one hundred kilometers (sixty-two miles) 
above sea level, is the most widely recognized.12 
In total, there are five United Nations (U.N.) treaties at the heart of 
 
 9. The main space resources in question here are mined metals, such as platinum, palladium, 
and gold, to be brought back to Earth, as well as hydrogen and oxygen stores to stock rocket refueling 
stations in space. Erik Simonsen, Precious Metal Hunters Look to Outer Space, CNBC (Nov. 21, 2013, 
10:26 AM), https://cnb.cx/2xAiFdd. 
 10. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 11. The principle theories are the aerodynamic-lift theory, the atmospheric space theory, the 
usque ad infinitum theory, and the lowest-altitude-of-satellite-orbit theory. John A. Vosburgh, Where 
Does Outer Space Begin?, 56 A.B.A. J. 134, 134 (1970). 
 12. A Brief History of Space, INST. PHYSICS, http://www.iop.org/resources/topic/archive/space 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2018). At this altitude, an airplane would have to travel at a speed greater than orbital 
velocity in order to stay in the air. Id. 
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international space law. These are the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,13 the 1968 
Rescue and Return Agreement,14 the 1972 Liability Convention,15 the 1975 
Registration Convention,16 and the 1979 Moon Agreement.17 Of these, by far the 
most important and comprehensive is the Outer Space Treaty. Referred to as the 
“constitution of space,” the Outer Space Treaty is the primary document that 
establishes fundamental rules about States’ activities in space.18 All the major 
space powers are party to this treaty, including the United States, as are many 
non-space-going nations. In total, the treaty has been ratified by 107 States.19 
For a consideration of property rights in outer space, the most significant 
provisions of the Treaty are Articles I and II. Because of their importance to the 




The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial 
bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, 
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the 
province of all mankind. 
 
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for 
exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of 
equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to 
all areas of celestial bodies. 
 
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon 
and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international co-




Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national 
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any 
other means.20 
The phrase “not subject to national appropriation” in Article II is 
commonly referred to as the non-appropriation principle. It is the most important 
 
 13. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4. 
 14. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119.  
 15. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 
24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187.  
 16. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 
695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.  
 17. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 
5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement].  
 18. Jill Stuart, The Outer Space Treaty Has Been Remarkably Successful—But Is It Fit for the 
Modern Age?, CONVERSATION (Jan. 27, 2017, 11:59 AM), https://theconversation.com/the-outer-space-
treaty-has-been-remarkably-successful-but-is-it-fit-for-the-modern-age-71381. 
 19. U.N. OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer_space (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). 
 20. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4 (emphasis added). 
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phrase in the Treaty for the purposes of this Note, as will become apparent 
throughout the ensuing discussion. 
B. An Introduction to Customary International Law in Space 
Before delving into an examination of what customary international law 
relating to outer space used to be and indications of how it has changed, it is first 
helpful to briefly define customary international law. Broadly speaking, the 
United Nations has acknowledged that “[t]o determine the existence of a rule of 
customary international law and its content, it is necessary to ascertain whether 
there is a general practice accepted as law.”21 These two elements—(1) a general 
and consistent State practice that is (2) widely accepted as law (opinio juris)—
constitute the basis for determining whether customary international law exists.22 
This two-element approach is widely supported by State practice23 and has been 
accepted for the purposes of establishing evidence of customary international 
law in international tribunals.24 For instance, in the International Court of 
Justice’s (ICJ) decision in Nicaragua v. United States, the Court concluded that 
to determine whether a particular rule is entrenched as customary international 
law, “the conduct of the States should, in general, be consistent with such rule, 
and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should 
generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the 
recognition of a new rule.”25 
Often, in establishing the existence of customary international law, 
scholars and legal practitioners rely on a long history of State practice as a key 
component in demonstrating that the practice is general and consistent.26 Given 
the very recent development of space law, this condition clearly cannot apply to 
a discussion of customary international law of space. However, the lack of a long 
 
 21. Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur on the Identification of Customary International Law), 
Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/672 (May 22, 2014). 
 22. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States  102 (Am. Law Inst. 
1987); Vladlen S. Vereshchetin & Gennady M. Danilenko, Custom as a Source of International Law of 
Outer Space, 13 J. SPACE L. 22, 30 (1985) (“Custom as a source of international law, leads to the 
recognition of the legality of the existing practice if there is general consent, expressed in one form or 
another, to the observable rule of conduct on the part of the members of the international community.”). 
 23. See Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-
Uru., Annex A, Nov. 4, 2005, S. TREATY DOC. No. 109-9 (2006) (confirming the parties’ “shared 
understanding that ‘customary international law’ . . . results from a general and consistent practice of 
States that they follow from a sense of legal obligation”); Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Rwanda-U.S., Annex A, Feb. 19, 2008, S. TREATY DOC. No. 110-
23 (2008) (confirming the same definition of customary international law as the U.S.–Uruguay Treaty); 
Council Notice, Updated European Union Guidelines on Promoting Compliance with International 
Humanitarian Law, 2009 O.J. (C 303) 6, 12. 
 24. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 
U.N.T.S. 933. 
 25. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 
1986 I.C.J. 14, 98, ¶ 186 (June 27). 
 26. See, e.g., Manley O. Hudson, Article 24 of the Statute of the International Law Commission, 
[1950] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 24, 25, U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/16; Fredric L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding 
Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 146 (1987); Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary 
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1999) (defining Customary International Law as “the 
collection of international behavioral regularities that nations over time come to view as binding as a 
matter of law”). 
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history does not necessarily preclude the existence of customary international 
law. The ICJ has suggested that “the passage of only a short period of time is not 
necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary 
international law.”27 Despite the novelty of the field, customary State action 
already plays a key role in maintaining the international legal order of outer 
space.28 
Instead of relying on the length of time that States have treated a particular 
rule as customary international law, other potential sources of evidence that can 
support a claim of a customary international law include treaties, decisions of 
national courts and international tribunals, national legislation, diplomatic 
correspondence, opinions of national legal advisors, and the practice of 
international organizations.29 Because there is no long history to draw from in 
establishing the existence of customary international law in space, these other 
non-time-sensitive methods of establishing customary international law must 
replace a prolonged history of State practice. 
The United Nation’s acknowledged two-part understanding of customary 
international law is referenced throughout the Note. With this basic definition 
and its specific application to space in mind, we now move to an examination of 
customary international law as it relates to the non-appropriation principle. 
C. The Original Meaning Ascribed to the Non-Appropriation Principle 
When the Outer Space Treaty was originally drafted, Article II’s non-
appropriation clause was generally not considered ambiguous either in terms of 
which actors or what parts of outer space were encompassed therein. The Cold 
War sensibility that spurred the establishment of the Treaty and the realities of 
space exploration at the time, along with concrete written evidence in the 
Treaty’s travaux préparatoires and the contemporaneous works of legal 
scholars, combine to support the conclusion that the non-appropriation principle 
was originally construed broadly under customary international law. 
The Cold War origins of the Outer Space Treaty indicate a broad 
understanding of the non-appropriation principle.30 Countries in the 1960s feared 
the outcome if the two major space powers of the time, the United States and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), were to gain legal rights to 
appropriate space or celestial bodies from which they would be able to launch 
 
 27. N. Sea Cont. Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43, ¶ 74 (Feb. 20); see also Michael P. Scharf, 
Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law, 20 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 305, 306 (2014), 
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2166&context=faculty_publications 
(arguing that fundamental change “can serve as an accelerating agent, enabling customary international 
law to form much more rapidly and with less State practice than is normally thought to be possible”). In 
this light, the realm of space law is an ideal case for quick formation of custom. 
 28. See Vereshchetin & Danilenko, supra note 24 (“[I]n the modern international law of outer 
space, custom serves as a source of the creation and as a form of the existence of a number of rules 
governing the relations of states.”). 
 29. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n to the General Assembly (Part II), Ways 
and Means of Making the Evidence of Customary International Law More Readily Available, 1950 Y.B. 
INT’L L. COMM’N 367-72, U.N. Doc. A/1316. 
 30. See Gabrynowicz, supra note 5, at 1043. 
2019] Interpreting the Outer Space Treaty 155 
nuclear weapons.31 There were also incentives to keep space free and open to 
allow for the collection of intelligence via satellite.32 The Outer Space Treaty 
was therefore drafted and ratified in large part to prevent any appropriation—a 
goal that would have been seriously undermined had the signatories at the time 
not understood the Treaty to apply broadly. 
Technological limitations at the time of the Treaty’s drafting are also 
relevant when considering the likely original scope attributed to the non-
appropriation principle. Private individuals and corporations were not mentioned 
in the Treaty, likely not because they were purposefully excluded, but rather 
because the drafters at the time had no reason to imagine a need to extend the 
application of the Treaty to such parties.33 The Treaty was drafted under the 
assumption that States would be the only actors in space.34 Indeed, given the 
technological capabilities at the time, launching a human being into space 
required the full support of an entire nation—it would have been very near 
impossible for a private company to marshal the necessary resources to 
accomplish something similar on its own. 
This interpretation is supported in the Treaty’s travaux préparatoires. In a 
letter to the Chairman of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
dated June 16, 1966, Arthur Goldberg, the Permanent Representative of the 
United States, summarized the key points for inclusion in the eventual Outer 
Space Treaty. Specifically, he included as point two in his letter that “[c]elestial 
bodies should not be subject to any claim of sovereignty.”35 Later in the letter, 
when proposing draft language for the treaty itself, Goldberg incorporated this 
key point into a proposed treaty provision that read: “Celestial bodies are free 
for exploration and use by all States . . . .”36 The very broad “any claim of 
sovereignty” point was satisfied, in Goldberg’s view, by referring to States in the 
language of the Treaty. Had he thought that entities other than States might 
become involved with the exploration and use of outer space, the draft language 
he proposed likely would have been broader to conform to the underlying key 
point he described as foundational to the Treaty. 
Other elements of the Outer Space Treaty’s negotiating history also point 
to an implicit prohibition of private appropriation.37 Individual States’ reactions 
to the non-appropriation principle are particularly relevant. For instance, on 
 
 31. See id. 
 32. THOMAS GANGALE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUTER SPACE: SOVEREIGNTY AND PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 11 (2009). 
 33. For an example of a proposed outline for the Treaty that only contemplated State actors, see 
Letter from Arthur Goldberg, Permanent Representative of the U.S., to the Chairman of the Comm. on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (June 16, 1966), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_
C2_L012E.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Arthur Goldberg]. 
 34. See, e.g., Virgiliu Pop, Appropriation in Outer Space: The Relationship Between Land and 
Ownership and Sovereignty on the Celestial Bodies, 16 SPACE POL’Y 275, 276 (2000) (noting how the 
treaty neglected to mention individuals or corporations); Fabio Tronchetti, The Non-Appropriation 
Principle Under Attack: Using Article II of the Outer Space Treaty in Its Defence, 50 PROC. L. OUTER 
SPACE 526, 530 (2007) (describing the role of the United States and Soviet Union in the Treaty’s genesis 
and their focus on balance of State power). 
 35. Letter from Arthur Goldberg, supra note 33 (emphasis added). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Pop, supra note 34, at 276. 
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August 4, 1966, the head of the Belgium delegation stated that his country “had 
taken note of the interpretation of the term ‘non-appropriation’ advanced by 
several delegations—apparently without contradiction—as covering both the 
establishment of sovereignty and the creation of titles to property in private law.” 
38 The French delegate voiced a similar opinion, mentioning that “there was 
reason to be satisfied that [the] basic principle [was] affirmed, namely: the 
prohibition of any claim of sovereignty or property rights in space . . . .”39 
There are indications that even before the Outer Space Treaty was drafted, 
customary international law prohibited appropriation of outer space.40 Most 
notably, two U.N. General Assembly Resolutions that formed the basis of the 
text of Article II, one adopted in 196141 and the other in 1962,42 were accepted 
unanimously. This unanimity presents evidence of an opinio juris among the 
U.N. members that space and its resources were not subject to appropriation even 
prior to the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967.43 Thus, Article II merely 
formalized in writing what was already customary international law in practice.44 
Although Article II officially confirmed that outer space could not be 
appropriated, this understanding predated the ratification of the Treaty.45 
As yet another indication of the legal consensus of the time, C. Wilfred 
Jenks, writing two years before the Treaty’s adoption, noted that the only means 
by which any part of space might be appropriated would be through the United 
Nations acting on behalf of the world community as a whole.46 States acting on 
their own, and certainly individuals, had no right to appropriate any part of space. 
Even as late as 1979, there was still an implicit understanding that the non-
appropriation principle applied broadly to all celestial resources, at least for 
commercial purposes. Writing about the Moon Agreement, which purported to 
apply many of the principles of the Outer Space Treaty specifically to the moon, 
F.G. von der Dunk noted an understanding of the delegates that “any 
substantial—especially commercial—exploitative activities required the consent 
of the community of States.”47 
Stephen Gorove was one of the few legal scholars of the late 1960s who, 
rather prophetically, noted that the non-appropriation principle was not as 
unambiguous as its drafters may have assumed. He understood the drafting of 
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty as founded on several assumptions: that only 
States would seek to appropriate space resources; and that the phrase “the moon 
and other celestial bodies” would be interpreted as the entire celestial body, 
 
 38. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Tronchetti, supra note 34, at 530. 
 41. G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI), at 6 (Dec. 20, 1961); Tronchetti, supra note 34, at 530. 
 42. G.A. Res. 1802 (XVII), at 5 (Dec. 14, 1962); Tronchetti, supra note 34, at 530. 
 43. Tronchetti, supra note 34, at 530. 
 44. Id. at 527. 
 45. Id. 
 46. C. WILFRED JENKS, SPACE LAW 201 (1965). 
 47. F.G. von der Dunk, The Moon Agreement and the Prospect of Commercial Exploitation of 
Lunar Resources, 32 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 91, 98 (2007) (emphasis added). 
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including extracted resources such as mined minerals.48 Gorove highlighted the 
potential loopholes in the Treaty that these assumptions created, which would 
allow the non-appropriation principle to be twisted into something quite different 
from what its authors originally intended: 
[T]he Treaty in its present form appears to contain no prohibition regarding 
individual appropriation or acquisition by a private association or an international 
organization, even if other than the United Nations. Thus, at present, an individual 
acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another individual or a private association 
or an international organization could lawfully appropriate any part of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies.49 
But, again, this view was unusual at the time. Even among academics, the 
concept of private companies or individuals at the forefront of the space frontier 
was not widely explored. 
Some modern legal theorists have argued that the drafters of the Outer 
Space Treaty did in fact intend to purposefully exclude individuals and private 
corporations in their articulation of the non-appropriation principle.50 Most 
often, these arguments rely on the fact that the 1979 Moon Agreement uses 
language that specifically references individuals in discussing the principle of 
non-appropriation—language that is lacking in the Outer Space Treaty.51 
However, this reasoning is flawed. The Moon Agreement was drafted a full 
twelve years after the Outer Space Treaty. The broader language of the Moon 
Agreement can therefore not be said to indicate that the Outer Space Treaty 
intentionally created a loophole for private individuals; in terms of the 
development of human space capabilities, 1967 and 1979 were incredibly 
different eras and the human imagination of what was possible in space had 
greatly expanded in the meantime.52 It is also noteworthy that this “loophole” 
argument surfaced in the 1980s, which is later than would be anticipated had this 
been in the delegates’ minds during the drafting of the Outer Space Treaty in 
1967. 
II. THE FIRST SHIFT IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW’S INTERPRETATION 
OF THE NON-APPROPRIATION PRINCIPLE 
Since the drafting of the Outer Space Treaty, several States have chosen to 
reinterpret the non-appropriation principle as narrower in scope than its drafters 
 
 48. Stephen Gorove, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 
349, 349 (1969). 
 49. Id. at 351. 
 50. See, e.g., Alan Wasser & Douglas Jobes, Space Settlements, Property Rights, and 
International Law: Could a Lunar Settlement Claim the Lunar Real Estate It Needs to Survive?, 73 J. AIR 
L. & COM. 37 (2008); Wayne N. White, Proposal for a Multilateral Treaty Regarding Jurisdiction and 
Real Property Rights in Outer Space, SPACE FUTURE (2001), http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/
proposal_for_a_multilateral_treaty_regarding_jurisdiction_and_real_property_rights_in_outer_space.sht
ml. 
 51. Moon Agreement, supra note 17, art. 11, para. 3; see discussion infra, Section II.A. 
 52. Ossiana Tepfenhart, History of Private Spaceflight Companies, FUTURISM (2017), 
https://futurism.media/history-of-private-spaceflight-companies (suggesting that private spaceflight 
companies emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a response to witnessing NASA’s success in the 
realm of space). 
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originally intended. This reinterpretation has gone largely unchallenged and has 
in fact been widely adopted by space-faring nations. In turn, this has had the 
effect of changing customary international law relating to the non-appropriation 
principle. Shifting away from its original blanket application in 1967, States have 
carved out an exception to the non-appropriation principle, allowing 
appropriation of extracted space resources.53 This Part examines this shift in the 
context of the two branches of the United Nation’s customary international law 
standard: State practice and opinio juris. 
A. State Practice 
The earliest hint of a change in customary international law relating to the 
interpretation of the non-appropriation clause came in 1969, when the United 
States first sent astronauts to the moon. As part of his historic journey, astronaut 
Neil Armstrong collected moonrocks that he brought back with him to Earth and 
promptly handed off to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) as U.S. property.54 Later, the USSR similarly claimed lunar material as 
government property, some of which was eventually sold to private citizens. 55 
These first instances of space resource appropriation did not draw much 
attention, but they presented a distinct shift marking the beginning of a new 
period in State practice. Having previously been limited by their technological 
capabilities, States could now establish new practices with respect to celestial 
bodies. This was the beginning of a pattern of appropriation that slowly unfolded 
over the next few decades and has since solidified into the general and consistent 
State practice necessary to establish the existence of customary international law. 
Currently, the U.S. government owns 842 pounds of lunar material.56 There 
is little question that NASA and the U.S. government consider this material, as 
well as other space materials collected by American astronauts, to be government 
property.57 In fact, NASA explicitly endorses U.S. property rights over these 
moon rocks, stating that “[l]unar material retrieved from the Moon during the 
Apollo Program is U.S. government property.”58 
 
 53. Most legal scholars agree that the Outer Space Treaty is itself an example of customary 
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Space Property Rights and Infrastructure 8 (Amer. Inst. Aeronautics & Astronautics, Working Paper, 
2005), http://www.astrosociology.com/Library/PDF/Submissions/To%20Build%20Bifrost.pdf. 
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The U.S. delegation’s reaction to the language of the 1979 Moon 
Agreement further cemented this interpretation that appropriation of extracted 
resources is a permissible exception to the non-appropriation clause of Article 
II. Although the United States is not a party to the Moon Agreement, it did 
participate in the negotiations.59 The Moon Agreement states in relevant part: 
Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof or natural 
resources in place, shall become property of any State, international 
intergovernmental or nongovernmental organization, national organization or non-
governmental entity or of any natural person.60 
In response to this language, the U.S. delegation made a statement laying 
out the American view that the words “in place” imply that private property 
rights apply to extracted resources61—a comment that went completely 
unchallenged. That all States seemed to accept this point, even those bound by 
the Moon Agreement, is further evidence of a shift in customary international 
law.62 
B. Opinio Juris: Domestic Legislation 
Domestic law, both in the United States and abroad, provides further 
evidence of the shift in customary international law surrounding the issue of non-
appropriation as it relates to extracted space resources. 
Domestic U.S. space law is codified at Section 51 of the U.S. Code and has 
been regularly modified to expand private actors’ rights in space.63 Beginning in 
1984, the Commercial Space Launch Act provided that “the United States should 
encourage private sector launches and associated services.”64 The goal of the 
1984 Act was to support commercial space launches by private companies and 
individuals.65 It did not, however, specifically discuss commercial exploitation 
of space. The first such mention of commercial use of space appeared in 2004, 
with the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act.66 This Act specifically 
aimed at regulating space tourism but did not explicitly guarantee any private 
rights in space.67 
The most significant change in U.S. space law came with the passage of 
the Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship (SPACE) 
Act in 2015. As incorporated into Section 51 of the Code, this Act provides: 
A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or a 
space resource under this chapter shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space 
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resource obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid 
resource or space resource obtained in accordance with applicable law, including the 
international obligations of the United States.68 
Whereas the idea that private corporations might go into space may have 
seemed far-fetched to the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty, the SPACE Act of 
2015 was the first instance of a government recognizing such a trend and 
officially supporting private companies’ commercial rights to space resources 
under law. With the new 2015 amendment to Section 51 in place, U.S. companies 
can now rest assured that any profits they reap from space mining are firmly 
legal—at least within U.S. jurisdictions. 
Although the United States was the first country to officially reinterpret the 
non-appropriation principle, other countries are following suit. On July 20, 2017, 
Luxembourg passed a law entitled On the Exploration and Utilization of Space 
Resources with a vote of fifty-five to two.69 The law took effect on August 1, 
2017.70 Article 1 of the new law states simply that “[s]pace resources can be 
appropriated,” and Article 3 expressly grants private companies permission to 
explore and use space resources for commercial purposes.71 Official commentary 
on the law establishes that its goal is to provide companies with legal certainty 
regarding ownership over space materials—a goal that the commentators regard 
as legal under the Outer Space Treaty despite the non-appropriation principle.72 
The next country to enact similar legislation may be the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). According to the UAE Space Agency director general, 
Mohammed Al Ahbabi, the UAE is currently in the process of drafting a space 
law covering both human space exploration and commercial activities such as 
mining.73 To further this goal, in 2017 the UAE set up the Space Agency 
Working Group on Space Policy and Law to specify the procedures, 
mechanisms, and other standards of the space sector, including an appropriate 
legal framework.74 
Other major space powers are also considering similar laws in the future, 
including Japan, China, and Australia. 75 Senior officials within China’s space 
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program have explicitly stated that the country’s goal is to explore outer space 
and to take advantage of outer space resources.76 The general international trend 
clearly points in this direction in anticipation of a potential “space gold rush.” 77 
C. Opinio Juris: Legal Scholarship 
Mirroring the shift in State practice and domestic laws, the legal 
community has also changed its approach to the interpretation of the non-
appropriation principle. Whereas at the time of the ratification of the Outer Space 
Treaty the majority of legal scholars tended to apply the non-appropriation 
principle broadly, most legal scholars now view appropriation of extracted 
materials as permissible.78 Brandon Gruner underscores that this new view is 
historically distinct from prior legal interpretation, noting that modern 
interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty’s non-appropriation principle differ 
from those of the Treaty’s authors.79 
In contrast to earlier legal theory that denied the possibility of appropriation 
of any space resources, scholars now widely accept that extracting space 
resources from celestial bodies is a “use” permitted by the Outer Space Treaty 
and that extracted materials become the property of the entity that performed the 
extraction.80 Stressing the fact that the Treaty does not explicitly prohibit 
appropriating resources from outer space, other authors conclude that the use of 
extracted space resources is permitted, meaning that the new SPACE Act is a 
plausible interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty.81 
However, scholars have been careful to cabin the extent to which they 
accept the legality of appropriation. For instance, although Thomas Gangale and 
Marilyn Dudley-Rowley acknowledge the legality of private appropriation of 
extracted space resources, they nonetheless emphasize that “[o]wnership of and 
the right to use extraterrestrial resources is distinct from ownership of real 
property” and that any such claim to real property is illegal.82 Lawrence Cooper 
is also careful to point out this distinction: “[t]he [Outer Space] Treaties 
recognize sovereignty over property placed into space, property produced in 
space, and resources removed from their place in space, but ban sovereignty 
claims by states; international law extends this ban to individuals.”83 
Although there remain some scholars who still insist on the illegality of the 
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2015 U.S. law and State appropriation of space resources generally,84 their 
dominance has waned since the 1960s. These scholars are now a minority in the 
face of general acceptance among the legal community that minerals and other 
space resources, once extracted, may be legally claimed as property. 85 
Taken together, the elements described above—statements made in the 
international arena, de facto appropriation of space resources in the form of moon 
rocks, the adoption of new national policies permitting appropriation of extracted 
space resources, and the weight of the international legal community’s opinion—
indicate a fundamental shift in customary international law. The Outer Space 
Treaty’s non-appropriation clause has been redefined via customary 
international law norms from its broad application to now include a carve-out 
allowing appropriation of space resources once such resources have been 
extracted. 
III. IMPENDING SECOND SHIFT IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW’S 
INTERPRETATION OF THE NON-APPROPRIATION PRINCIPLE 
In contrast to Part II, which dealt with customary international law relating 
to property claims over materials that are extracted from space, this Part explores 
customary international law in relation to the idea of appropriation of in situ 
space property. Section II.A first establishes current customary international law 
norms that prohibit in situ space property ownership via an examination of State 
practice and opinio juris. Section II.B then suggests that, mirroring the first shift 
in customary international law norms related to extracted space resources, a 
nascent second shift in the interpretation of the non-appropriation principle 
regarding in situ space property ownership is likely on the horizon. 
The prospect of high profits from the extraction of space resources will 
likely incentivize private companies and individuals to pressure States to 
recognize and protect private in situ property rights—which, as previously 
discussed, is not expressly prohibited by Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. As 
increasing government openness to private commercial space activities suggests, 
States will likely buckle under this pressure and allow private companies or 
private entities under State control to exercise ownership rights. Unless the 
international community acts soon to clarify the meaning of the non-
appropriation principle of the Outer Space Treaty, it is possible that a second 
organic shift in customary international law will develop and allow for private 
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ownership of in situ space property in further contravention of the original intent 
of the Treaty. 
A. Current Rejection of Individual Property Rights in Space 
Although the internationally recognized scope of the non-appropriation 
principle has been pared back to allow for the ownership of space resources upon 
extraction, there is still currently a general acceptance in customary international 
law that the principle prohibits States, individuals, and private corporations from 
owning in situ property in space. State practice, domestic legislation, and legal 
scholarship all tend to support this conclusion. 
1. State Practice 
Currently, States act in accordance with the original understanding of the 
non-appropriation treaty insofar as they have not endorsed individuals’ claims to 
in situ property in space (as distinct from endorsement of property rights to 
resources after extraction). 
One anecdote that exemplifies the United States’ unwillingness to 
acknowledge private individuals’ in situ property rights in outer space comes 
from the case Nemitz v. United States.86 On February 12, 2001, NASA’s Near 
Earth Asteroid Rendezvous Shoemaker became the first spacecraft to land on the 
surface of an asteroid when it touched down on Eros, a twenty-one-mile long 
asteroid in the sun’s orbit.87 On February 16, 2001, NASA received a letter from 
Gregory Nemitz, in which Nemitz claimed ownership over Eros (effectively 
asserting in situ property rights over the asteroid) and attempted to charge NASA 
a twenty dollar “parking/storage fee” for NASA’s use of the asteroid.88 NASA 
General Counsel Edward Frankle’s eventual response, after a series of back-and-
forth exchanges, was to deny that Nemitz had any property rights to the asteroid 
as a celestial body because to acknowledge otherwise would be in contravention 
of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.89 The matter was settled in court, with 
the presiding judge relying on similar reasoning in finding for NASA.90 
Other challenges to the principle of non-appropriation of in situ space 
property, most notably in the Bogotá Declaration of 1976, have also been struck 
down.91 In the Declaration, eight equatorial nations, including Colombia, Congo, 
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Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo), with Brazil as an observer, claimed sovereignty over in situ space 
property in the form of geostationary orbits above their territories.92 
Geostationary orbits, thirty-six thousand kilometers above Earth’s equator, are 
particularly valuable because at this distance a satellite orbits the Earth at a speed 
equal to the Earth’s rotation, allowing that satellite to remain over a fixed point 
on the Earth’s surface.93 However, the Bogotá Declaration’s attempted 
appropriation of geostationary orbits was rejected internationally as inconsistent 
with Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.94 
Since the Bogotá Declaration, there have not been any significant 
challenges to the non-appropriation principle concerning appropriation of in situ 
space property.95 There are also no major persistent State objectors who claim 
the right of ownership of in situ property.96 Although customary international 
law has come to accept State and individual ownership of extracted space 
resources, current State practice supports the conclusion that appropriation of in 
situ space property (in the form of entire celestial bodies, as with Eros, or 
particular swaths of space or orbits, as in the Bogotá Declaration) remains 
impermissible under the non-appropriation clause of the Outer Space Treaty. 
2. Opinio Juris: Domestic Legislation 
The United States has ensured that its commitment to the non-
appropriation principle (other than the exception discussed above concerning 
extracted resources) is codified in domestic law. Restricting its otherwise 
expansive language, the SPACE Act of 2015 reads: “It is the sense of Congress 
that by the enactment of this Act, the United States does not thereby assert 
sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the 
ownership of, any celestial body.”97 
Other countries have also recognized this limitation to private ownership 
of space in customary international law. For instance, commentary to the new 
Luxembourg law emphasizes that 
[t]he scope of this law is . . . limited to space resources and does not apply to 
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asteroids, comets and celestial bodies as such, whose appropriation is prohibited by 
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, a.k.a. the 1967 
Outer Space Treaty.98 
In their explicit compliance with international law, other States’ outer 
space laws similarly reject private appropriation of space.99 
3. Opinio Juris: Legal Scholarship 
Legal scholars also generally accept that the non-appropriation principle 
legally extends to private individuals as well as to States.100 Articulations of this 
position tend to follow one of three lines of reasoning: (1) Article II implicitly 
bans individual appropriation; (2) even if Article II does not itself ban individual 
appropriation, the de facto outcome of the explicit bar in Article II against State 
appropriation of space will necessarily also preclude meaningful individual 
ownership; or (3) regardless of the language of Article II, customary 
international law itself precludes private in situ appropriation of land or property 
in space. But cracks are emerging even in these three seemingly strong legal 
arguments. 
Several scholars assert that the language of Article II itself implicitly bans 
individual appropriation. The most straightforward argument in this line of 
reasoning is that the Treaty precludes all sovereignty and ownership in space and 
over its celestial bodies, regardless of whether “the claim comes from nation-
states, natural persons, or juridical persons,” indicating a complete moratorium 
on in situ property rights in space.101 Other scholars conclude that Article II 
implicitly bans private appropriation as well as State appropriation because 
property ownership implies control over access: given that Article I guarantees 
universal free access to all celestial bodies, private appropriation of any celestial 
body cannot legally occur.102 
The second approach to the private appropriation question is perhaps the 
most common: a recognition that Article II does not explicitly or implicitly ban 
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individual appropriation, but that in the absence of State endorsement of these 
rights (which itself is prohibited), “individual property” as such has no meaning. 
This approach is exemplified in Fabio Tronchetti’s work. He explains: 
[T]here is a general consensus on the fact that both national appropriation and private 
property rights are denied under the Outer Space Treaty . . . . Private entities are 
allowed to carry out space activities but, according to Article VI of the Outer Space 
Treaty, they must be authorized to conduct such activities by the appropriate State 
of nationality. But if the State is prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, then it 
lacks the authority to license its nationals or other entities subject to its jurisdiction 
to engage in that prohibited activity.103 
Other scholars make similar arguments. Virgiliu Pop, for instance, claims 
that “[a]ppropriation of land can exist outside the sphere of sovereignty, but its 
survival is dependent upon endorsement from a sovereign entity.”104 Because 
“the Outer Space Treaty prohibits the national appropriation of outer space and 
celestial bodies,” he argues “a State endorsement would be interpreted as a 
means of national appropriation, hence it would be unlawful.”105 
Finally, approaching the question from a customary international law 
perspective, Deva Prasad emphasizes that both State practice and opinio juris 
“clearly support the fact that the non-appropriation principle is a customary 
international law,” noting “widespread acceptance [of the] non-appropriation 
principle by the States” as well as the absence of any persistent objectors.106 
Thus, even if Article II does not ban private individuals from owning land in and 
of itself, customary international law in the aggregate is enough to condemn 
private appropriation of land in space as illegal. 
B. Emerging Theories of In Situ Property Rights in Space 
Despite the evidence that customary international law currently proscribes 
in situ appropriation of space property, I argue that a nascent second shift in the 
interpretation of the non-appropriation principle, which would allow for such in 
situ ownership, is likely on the horizon. The possibility of such a shift arises from 
the sheer magnitude of the economic incentives private corporations will have to 
urge such a recognition. And, if States seek to establish in situ ownership, they 
will have at their disposal emerging legal arguments pointing to cracks in the 
theories that the non-appropriation principle bars private ownership of in situ 
property. Although not yet the basis for any State action, the increasing 
momentum of these theories portends a second shift in customary international 
law to allow for in situ ownership of space property. 
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1. Economic Incentives Portending a Second Shift in Customary 
International Law’s Interpretation of the Non-Appropriation 
Principle 
The economic incentives for nations with space-faring capabilities to push 
for a second shift in customary international law’s interpretation of the non-
appropriation principle are astronomical. The value of the iron in 16 Psyche 
alone, an asteroid NASA is planning to explore via spacecraft to be launched in 
2023, tops 10,000 quadrillion.107 Although NASA is planning the venture for 
purely scientific purposes,108 this sort of money creates enormous incentives for 
private corporations to pressure their governments to secure the international 
recognition of private property rights. 
The current legal regime recognized by States (in which property 
ownership is recognized for extracted resources only) is likely not enough 
assurance for commercial enterprises that their investments will be protected. 
For instance, although the United States has claimed the right to resources once 
they are extracted from outer space, there would still be significant legal 
uncertainty as to the rights to outer space mines themselves. Under the current 
system, China or Russia could legally profit from a U.S.-operated mining facility 
without having invested any of the initial capital because the Outer Space Treaty 
prevents the United States from appropriating the land which harbors the mine. 
There would also be legal questions concerning the establishment of permanent 
space colonies, a goal several private companies have announced their intention 
of pursuing.109 Establishing a system of in situ property ownership is therefore 
likely to be significantly more appealing than a system that allows only for 
appropriation of extracted resources. 
2. Legal Theories Supporting the Right to In Situ Private 
Property in Space 
If States decide to explore this avenue, they will have at their disposal the 
work of several legal theorists, who rely on appeals to both textual arguments 
and to the realities of the fragility of space law, to push back against the currently 
accepted norm that private individuals cannot own land or other property in 
space. These theorists have been described as a “minority of authors,”110 but their 
claims may lay the foundation for a second shift in customary law. When 
technology develops to the point that individual appropriation becomes possible, 
 
 107. Michael Buchanan, NASA Goes Heavy Metal with Visit to Iron-Rich Asteroid, 
SHAREAMERICA (Jan. 26, 2017), https://share.america.gov/nasa-plans-heavy-metal-visit-to-iron-rich-
asteroid. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See, e.g., Michael J. Coren, As Silicon Valley Lays Plans to Colonize Mars, Researchers 
Offer a Blueprint for Governing It, QUARTZ MEDIA (June 10, 2016), https://qz.com/702624/as-silicon-
valley-lays-plans-to-colonize-mars-researchers-offer-a-blueprint-for-governing-it; Jason Davis, SpaceX 
CEO Elon Musk Updates Mars Colonization Plans, PLANETARY SOC’Y (Sept. 29, 2017), 
http://www.planetary.org/blogs/jason-davis/2017/20170929-spacex-updated-colonization-plans.html; 
Human Settlement on Mars, MARS ONE, http://www.mars-one.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). 
 110. Pop, supra note 34, at 276. 
168 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 44: 1 
international norms may shift for a second time, relying on these theories to 
exclude private individuals and corporations from the ambit of the non-
appropriation principle. 
From a textual perspective, proponents of this view often rely on the 
doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.111 This canon of construction 
dictates that expressly including one thing implies the exclusion of the 
alternative. Some legal scholars have applied this canon to the Outer Space 
Treaty to interpret Article II’s failure to expressly ban private appropriation as 
an explicit indication that private appropriation is legal. Among such scholars 
are Alan Wasser and Douglas Jobes, who argue that “if the framers of the Outer 
Space Treaty had intended to mean that States may not authorize their citizens 
to do anything which they themselves cannot do, they would have written such 
language into the Treaty explicitly.”112 Once private individuals or corporations 
have appropriated space, States would be within their rights to recognize these 
claims. Thus, for example, 
the United States simply could state that it would recognize claims by United States 
nationals (and perhaps by others as well) who discover valuable deposits of minerals 
or other wealth . . . . Recognition of these claims (and protection of them, if 
necessary, from third parties) would not constitute “national appropriation” or the 
exercise of sovereignty over territory, but rather the exercise of United States 
jurisdiction over its citizens and of its power to protect them against third parties in 
international common areas.113 
According to some of these theorists, a narrow interpretation of Article II 
would legally “allow other entities like private companies and non-governmental 
organizations to appropriate territory.”114 
Another textual argument scholars have advanced to support a narrower 
reading of the non-appropriation principle is that the clause is exceedingly vague, 
and therefore State parties are free to interpret the principle however each sees 
fit.115 Instead of waiting years for international consensus and change, the United 
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States on its own authority could simply “ignore the 1967 Space Treaty’s no-
sovereignty provision”116 and instead act in accordance with whatever provisions 
it deemed internally desirable. Putting a finer gloss on what is essentially the 
same point, Wasser and Jobes’ view is that the non-appropriation principle has 
proven itself to be ambiguous, and as such, “each signatory must interpret for 
itself what its obligations are.”117 They later imply that the United States should 
do what is best for itself—which may mean allowing private appropriation of in 
situ space property.118 Furthermore, some of these same scholars have suggested 
that the development of customary international law may not rest solely State 
actions and may be developed by non-State actors’ actions as well.119 Given the 
incentives private companies have to promote the right to property ownership in 
outer space despite Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, this prospect should be 
particularly disquieting for those who hope for an equitable distribution of space 
resources. 
Accompanying these textual arguments, some scholars have suggested that 
such a shift would not be difficult to accomplish given the fragility and 
malleability of customary international law as it relates to space. As Wasser and 
Jobes point out, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to establish the 
basis of the customary international law for private appropriation of extracted 
resources simply by asserting ownership over moon rocks they brought back 
from space.120 Similarly, as to the establishment of rights to ownership of 
physical territory in space under customary international law, all that is needed 
may be “an international private settlement simply landing on and taking 
possession of a hunk of Lunar land.”121 Although attempting to appropriate the 
moon would likely generate an international outcry, it is not clear that the 
appropriation of a distant asteroid would incite significant protest, even though 
it could lay the foundation for a shift in customary international law. 
Significantly, such a shift may occur in State practice even if the legal 
arguments to support this change are weaker than the arguments supporting a 
continuation of the prohibition of private appropriation. Should States buckle to 
private commercial pressures or independently recognize the economic benefits 
of domestic companies obtaining private property in celestial territory, States 
would have a newfound interest in recognizing and protecting in situ rights. The 
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legal justifications for de jure or de facto cooperation in non-recognition would 
likely become subordinate to economic incentives—spurring the adoption of 
new legal arguments to support shifting State interests. 
IV. THE NEED FOR A NEW LEGAL ORDER 
Given these trends, the international community would do well to rethink 
the Outer Space Treaty—and soon. Without a clearer articulation of what the 
international community agrees is the meaning and scope of the non-
appropriation principle, it is entirely possible that States will use legal arguments 
like the ones outlined above to reinterpret Article II to serve the commercial 
interests of their domestic companies. Even in this new era of extraterrestrial 
enterprise, many of the norms underlying the Outer Space Treaty, such as 
equitable access and peaceful use, would remain important goals shared by 
members of the international community. Without an internationally agreed-
upon principle to guide State and private practice, however, these norms could 
become unobtainable and the fundamental spirit of the Treaty would again be 
violated. As Fabio Tronchetti puts it: 
[I]f any subject was allowed to appropriate parts of outer space, the basic aim of the 
drafters of the Treaty, namely to prevent a colonial competition in outer space and 
to create the conditions and premises for an exploration and use of outer space carried 
out for the benefit of all States, would be betrayed.122 
But this outcome is not inevitable. Although economic pressures may make 
this second shift unavoidable, the international community still has the chance 
to orchestrate the manner in which this change occurs and work to set up a legal 
order to preserve the original goals and purposes of the Outer Space Treaty. This 
Part first examines various proposals in the literature for property rights 
allocation systems then proposes a new leasing system modeled on the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
A. Proposals in the Literature for a Space Property Rights Allocation 
System 
In clarifying the Outer Space Treaty and the non-appropriation principle, 
the international community will have several options. One solution legal 
theorists have proposed is to simply restate in clear terms that all in situ property 
rights to land in space are illegal under Article II.123 However, denying all access 
to property rights across the board is an inadequate solution for several reasons. 
First, as a practical matter, States (at least the ones with space-faring capabilities) 
are unlikely to sign off on something so restrictive. Second, although colonizing 
and appropriating space could result in significant negative outcomes if not 
undertaken carefully (including currently unknown environmental impacts both 
on Earth and in space), exploration and exploitation could lead to significant 
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benefits, such as advances in medicine and energy technology. It would be better 
to work to reap these benefits in an organized way rather than to allow the 
scramble for control of space that will likely result if the international community 
does not allow an outlet for this ambition. But the exact nature of the appropriate 
solution is less clear. 
Relying on these approaches to the non-appropriation principle, several 
legal theorists have begun exploring hypothetical systems for allocating space 
property. Among the more frequently cited options are a property system that 
assumes the right of first possession;124 a system that operates under the right of 
continued use;125 a credit swap system;126 and a system that proposes dividing 
up space into equal portions and allocating each portion to one country.127 
Many of these proposed systems require, at a minimum, a substantial 
overhaul of the current Outer Space Treaty and, at the extreme end, involve 
revoking the Treaty (or at least the portions dealing with equity and non-
appropriation) entirely. For instance, Ty Twibell recommends that Article II of 
the Outer Space Treaty be removed and replaced with language detailing a 
method for allocating celestial bodies to various entities.128 Byron Brittingham 
goes further, suggesting the international community scrap the Outer Space 
Treaty entirely and replace it with a new treaty whose primary purpose would be 
to allocate private property rights in space.129 Kurt Anderson Baca argues that 
property rights in space are indispensable for development of space resources 
and therefore recommends that the issue of sovereignty be reconsidered in 
space.130 This sentiment is further echoed by Glenn Reynolds, who is a strong 
proponent of a full-scale property rights regime.131 
One common proposal that is more in line with the fundamental tenets of 
the Outer Space Treaty is the creation of a credit system. This proposal, however, 
is riddled with other flaws. In general, the idea of this system is that the United 
Nations or some other international body would establish a set quantity of 
 
 124. See, e.g., Carol R. Buxton, Property in Outer Space: The Common Heritage of Mankind 
Principle vs. the “First in Time, First in Right” Rule of Property Law, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 689 (2004); 
Gruner, supra note 76, at 306; Taylor R. Dalton, Developing the Final Frontier: Defining Private Property 
Rights on Celestial Bodies for the Benefit of All Mankind 24 (Aug. 16, 2010) (unpublished Graduate 
Student Paper, Cornell Law School); Wayne N. White, Real Property Rights in Outer Space, SPACE 
FUTURE (1998), http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/real_property_rights_in_outer_space.shtml. 
 125. See, e.g., Sohini Banerjee, Extraterrestrial Habitation and Space Law: A Socio-Legal 
Perspective, in SPACE LAW: THE EMERGING TRENDS, supra note 95, at 50; Lynn M. Fountain, Comment, 
Creating Momentum in Space: Ending the Paralysis Produced by the “Common Heritage of Mankind” 
Doctrine, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1753, 1777 (2003). 
 126. See, e.g., Basu, supra note 123, at 54; Edwin W. Paxson III, Note, Sharing the Benefits of 
Outer Space Exploration: Space Law and Economic Development, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 487, 513-14 
(1993); Jeremy L. Zell, Note, Putting a Mine on the Moon: Creating an International Authority to 
Regulate Mining Rights in Outer Space, 15 MINN. J. INT’L L. 489, 492 (2006). 
 127. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 83, at 117; Barbara Ellen Heim, Note, Exploring the Last 
Frontiers for Mineral Resources: A Comparison of International Law Regarding the Deep Seabed, Outer 
Space, and Antarctica, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 819, 846 (1990). 
 128. Twibell, supra note 116, at 683. 
 129. Bryon C. Brittingham, Does the World Really Need New Space Law?, 12 OR. REV. INT’L L. 
31 (2010). 
 130. Baca, supra note 115, at 1047. 
 131. Reynolds, supra note 113, at 236. 
172 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 44: 1 
minerals and other resources from outer space that can be brought to Earth in 
total, and then each country would be allocated a right to a share. Space-faring 
nations could exploit their shares directly. Those nations that are as of yet unable 
to exploit space resources themselves could sell their mineral mining rights to 
nations that are both able to exploit the resources and willing to pay the price of 
the share. As described by Arindrajit Basu, 
[t]he tradable nature of the credits could enable developing nations to benefit from 
the exploration and use of outer space monetarily even though they do not have the 
capability to exploit the natural resources. This credit trading system is certainly in 
sync with the non-appropriation principle as it is not vesting property rights on 
celestial bodies but merely allocating the rights to appropriate a certain quantity of 
natural resources over a set time period.132 
Although this system may appear more equitable than the Old-World-style 
“might is right”133 regime based on the rule of first possession, there are 
significant problems with this proposal. Most pressing among these are how to 
equitably divide up these shares. If done on a per-capita basis, key nations would 
likely not agree to the proposal: a per-capita system would allow China and India 
to accrue much larger shares than the United States, something the United States 
would probably not tolerate. On the other hand, doing otherwise would not be in 
keeping with the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty. Also concerning, this system 
does not specify where nations can mine their allocated share of minerals. There 
is consequently a good deal of room for conflict if two nations decide to mine 
their allotted minerals from the same asteroid source. As a third concern, this 
system does not address issues of space use beyond mineral mining. It does not, 
for instance, adequately deal with the concept of space tourism or, in the long 
term, address issues such as the development of space colonies. 
B. A New Property Rights Proposal: Leasing Space 
One promising proposal that does not appear to have received much 
attention in the literature is the concept of leasing space to nations, private 
individuals, or companies rather than allocating it as permanently-owned 
property. It appears that the only authors who have even tangentially considered 
the possibility of leasing property rights in space beyond rights to mineral 
extraction are Marcel Williams and G.S. Sachdeva. Williams’ writing is limited 
to a thought experiment in which he imagines renting out up to one percent of 
the moon’s surface. This property would be directly leased to national 
governments, which in turn would be vested with the power to sublease sections 
of this territory to private companies or individuals.134 This proposal is not 
elaborated any further and is left as a broad-strokes outline. The second mention 
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of leasing or renting space comes from G.S. Sachdeva, who argues that a U.N. 
Space Superintendence Authority could grant leases to those able to pay.135 Yet 
this theory is limited to a discussion of renting property rights in particular orbits 
to allow for hovering geostationary space hotels and does not delve into 
questions of renting land on celestial bodies. 
The concept of leasing outer space deserves greater consideration by space 
law scholars. This Section sketches a brief outline of how such a system might 
operate via an internationally-run space property rental system modeled on 
UNCLOS. Although UNCLOS itself is deeply problematic in its potentially 
devastating environmental consequences and negative impacts on indigenous 
peoples as it regulates deep-sea mining,136 the UNCLOS model may nonetheless 
be the best option for preserving non-space-faring nations’ rights with regard to 
outer space, given its success in providing developing nations with a voice in the 
regulation of the high seas and the seabed beyond national jurisdiction.137 It is 
worth noting that although very few scholars appear to have considered the 
possibility of renting space, several have examined the similarities between 
UNCLOS and space law.138 The approach advanced here differs from the 
conventional approach to this comparison in that it suggests that the international 
community move beyond merely authorizing nations or individuals to extract a 
certain quantity of minerals and instead consider the possibility of leasing out 
actual tracts of space land. 
Opened for signature on December 10, 1982, UNCLOS establishes the 
international rules that govern the use of the world’s oceans and their resources. 
An examination of UNCLOS is especially apt because it deals with resources—
the high seas—that, like space, are not subject to national appropriation. In 
language strikingly similar to Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, Article 137 
of UNCLOS reads: 
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No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the 
Area [resources of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction] or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridical person 
appropriate any part thereof.139 
Although there are clear similarities between the two treaties, there are 
substantial differences as well, many of which would be useful in informing an 
update to the Outer Space Treaty. In addition to extending the prohibition on 
sovereignty to individuals as well as to nations, UNCLOS goes far beyond the 
Outer Space Treaty in detailing the limits of the non-appropriation principle. All 
of Part XI of UNCLOS, totaling fifty-eight Articles, gives a detailed description 
of how States can negotiate within the bounds of the non-appropriation principle 
to exploit ocean resources. Of particular relevance for purposes of crafting a 
parallel space law proposal is UNCLOS Part XI, Section 4, which lays out the 
rules governing the International Seabed Authority—the main mechanism 
through which States and private companies can legally exploit ocean resources, 
including mining of the deep seabed.140 
Using UNCLOS as a model, a similar system may prove promising for the 
evolution of space law. However, the new space system should allow for rental 
of space land instead of merely allowing for the extraction of space resources. 
As with UNCLOS, any such space leasing system should be run through the 
United Nations. Situating such a system in this forum would help the 
international community stay true to the intentions of the Outer Space Treaty, 
which provides, in the words of one author, a “philosophical roadmap for the 
future development of the outer space legal regime.”141 Although a new 
committee within the United Nations could be formed for this purpose, the 
existing Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) would 
be an ideal environment for the creation and operation of such a system. 
UNCOPUOS is composed of eighty-seven geographically and economically 
diverse member States (including all the major space-faring States). 
Additionally, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental 
organizations have observer status.142 Given its central mission to maintain space 
as a peaceful arena of international cooperation, as well as its representative 
composition,143 it would be an ideal body to bring a space leasing system to 
fruition. 
UNCOPUOS, in turn, should operationalize the leasing system by 
establishing a new International Outer Space Authority. This Outer Space 
Authority should parallel the International Seabed Authority described above.144 
There should be similar provisions for the International Outer Space Authority 
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relating to the makeup and functioning of the Authority (with each country 
getting one vote and decisions made by a two-thirds majority);145 the power of 
the Outer Space Authority to exercise control over space generally;146 the ability 
to decide how much rent to charge nations or individual corporations;147 and how 
to use these funds,148 among other provisions. 
For this proposed Outer Space Authority to be useful as well as operational, 
it is critical that it have jurisdiction over property rights in space beyond mining 
rights. Having rights to property in addition to rights to extracted minerals would 
add an extra layer of legal security for companies considering venturing into 
space for mining purposes. And, although businesses currently seem most 
interested in the possibilities of mining space resources, in the long term, 
questions of space tourism and the potential development of space colonies may 
arise. Having a flexible system in place that can adequately handle these 
concerns is therefore desirable. Instead of just focusing on mining, an Outer 
Space Authority with broader jurisdiction will have longer staying power and 
will require less reworking in the near future. 
Part of the appeal of this rental model is that it works so seamlessly with 
the current Outer Space Treaty. Turning again to the language of the Treaty and 
beginning with the non-appropriation principle, Article II lays out that “[o]uter 
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national 
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any 
other means.”149 Because no State or individual would ever own land in space 
under a leasing system, this proposed leasing regime would not be in 
contravention to Article II. And yet, despite this, a leasing regime would 
establish enough legal security that exploitation of space resources would not be 
impeded—the main rationale for those who argue that the Treaty (or at least 
Article II) should be rescinded. 
Moreover, the principle established in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, 
that “[t]he exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all 
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and 
shall be the province of all mankind,” is also upheld under this leasing regime.150 
Leasing not only allows nations and private companies to exploit space resources 
and reap the benefits of their labor, but also directly benefits developing 
countries not yet able to tap into the resources of space by redistributing some of 
the space-going nations’ profits via a leasing fee and a tax on extracted resources. 
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A potential argument against this rental system, as well as any other 
international legal system that would seek to regulate property rights in space, is 
that the United States never signed on to UNCLOS and there is nothing different 
about this situation that would cause the United States to join an international 
treaty regulating property in space either. However, space law has a fairly 
different history than the law of the sea. These differences make it more likely 
(though unfortunately not certain) that a proposal for an International Outer 
Space Authority would be adopted by the United States despite the fact that the 
facially similar UNCLOS proposal failed to garner a two-thirds majority vote in 
the Senate. 
The major difference between UNCLOS and this proposed International 
Outer Space Authority is that the United States has self-interested reasons for 
supporting an International Outer Space Authority, whereas it did not have 
similar reasons to join UNCLOS. The United States has maintained that under 
customary international law, deep seabed mining is already permissible.151 Since 
the United States does not recognize limitations of deep seabed mining 
established in UNCLOS, it may legally undertake deep sea mining under 
customary international law—a right that is codified in domestic U.S. law in the 
Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act: 
[I]t is the legal opinion of the United States that exploration for and commercial 
recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed are freedoms of the high seas 
subject to a duty of reasonable regard to the interests of other states in their exercise 
of those and other freedoms recognized by general principles of international law . . 
. .152 
The United States therefore already has access to what it wants without 
having to join UNCLOS. As an additional point, there is also not much pressure 
from American companies to ratify UNCLOS, in part because the American 
Exclusive Economic Zone (recognized by the United States under customary 
international law)153 and the continental shelf is hugely rich in the resources 
companies might otherwise have hoped to gain by joining the Treaty and gaining 
access to minerals from deep sea mining in other areas. Finally, not only does 
the United States stand to gain very little by ratifying the Treaty, there is an 
argument that ratification would disadvantage the United States. Under 
UNCLOS, “coastal States are required to make payments to the International 
Seabed Authority based on a percentage of revenues derived from the 
exploitation of the resources found within the continental margin beyond two 
 
 151. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES  303, pt. V, 
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 152. 30 U.S.C.  1401(a)(12) (2018); see also 30 U.S.C.  1402 (2018). 
 153. See Bonnie A. McGregor, Terry W. Offield, The Exclusive Economic Zone: An Exciting 
New Frontier, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR 7, https://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/7000049/report.pdf (last visited Nov. 
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media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2746.pdf. 
2019] Interpreting the Outer Space Treaty 177 
hundred miles from the coast.”154 Notably, customary international law creates 
no such obligation.155 
In stark contrast to UNCLOS, the new rental system proposed would 
directly benefit the United States. Unlike with deep sea mining, the United States 
and its citizens currently are bound by a treaty that prohibits appropriation of 
space: the Outer Space Treaty. Unlike the UNCLOS analogy, the United States 
has already relinquished rights in this arena. Agreeing to a leasing amendment 
would expand the scope of its rights, not infringe upon them. Additionally, the 
United States does not have access to an outer space “exclusive economic zone” 
in the same way that it does for the sea. Without some sort of agreement, the 
United States simply may not legally appropriate any in situ property in outer 
space. 
One final consideration increases the likelihood that the United States 
would in fact become a signatory to an amendment to the Outer Space Treaty. 
Such an amendment would likely have the support of businesses, environmental 
groups, and the military, an unlikely combination of key constituencies that 
would help push an amended treaty forward. Businesses would advocate for the 
change because it would provide a clearer mechanism for establishing property 
rights.156 Environmental groups might push for the amendment’s ratification 
because of the environmental protections that could be included in such an 
agreement.157 Finally, the military would also likely be a proponent of the system 
because having access to property in space gives strategic advantages158 and 
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because it is likely that certain Cold War-era concerns that prompted space-
faring nations to sign the original Outer Space Treaty remain relevant—most 
notably, concerns over the weaponization of space.159 
CONCLUSION 
The brief history of outer space law since the adoption of the Outer Space 
Treaty in 1967 highlights the ease with which customary international law shifts 
in this arena. Despite an original broad interpretation of the non-appropriation 
principle during the Treaty’s drafting, customary international law has since 
carved out an exception to this principle for extracted space resources. A second 
shift could be similarly underway. Driven by economic incentives, States may 
reinterpret the non-appropriation principle to allow for private appropriation of 
space property. 
Currently, States have an incentive to cooperate to establish a new 
international agreement concerning the use of outer space because international 
law, as it is presently understood, prohibits private property rights in space. A 
new amendment could broaden these rights, providing an enticing carrot to 
encourage State cooperation. But this enticement may soon disappear. Given the 
flexibility of the current outer space legal regime, customary international law 
could easily shift to interpret the non-appropriation principle as allowing private 
appropriation of property in space. Whatever the international community 
decides is the optimal solution regarding outer space property rights, it is vital 
that action be taken now to preserve the principles advanced by the Outer Space 
Treaty, such as equitable access and peaceful use of outer space. As the original 
drafters of the Outer Space Treaty recognized, these principles are best protected 
through a formal agreement and not merely through customary international law, 
which is often driven by the most powerful States. Regardless of whether a rental 
system similar to the one described above is established or some other method is 
used, the international community will have to act quickly if it wants to maintain 
shared international control over space. Pursuing an amendment to the Treaty as 
described also provides certainty and timeliness, two elements that would likely 
appeal to constituencies that might otherwise be supposed to be content with 




 159. To the extent that this Note suggests that a shift toward in situ appropriation is on the 
horizon, there may arise a counter-argument to this Section that various constituencies, particularly the 
business community, have little to gain from such a proposal. If I am right that such a shift is imminent, 
companies may eventually be rewarded with actual property rights, not merely leasing rights, once 
customary international law has adequately shifted. However, relying on this eventual occurrence requires 
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